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Returning to Acosta: How In re A-BExemplifies the Need to Abolish the
“Socially Distinct” and “Particularity”
Requirements for a Particular Social
Group
Lauren Cherney†
Introduction
Ms. A.B. suffered abuse at the hands of those nearest to her
for the majority of her life.1 She lost her parents at a young age and
was then put in the care of a family who abused her, both physically
and verbally.2 She left their “care” in her twenties to marry. 3 Soon
after, her husband began abusing her as well. 4 For the next fifteen
years, Ms. A.B. suffered through physical, sexual, and emotional
abuse from her husband. 5 Her pleas for help to the Salvadoran
authorities, her attempts to relocate within El Salvador, and even
a divorce failed to keep her safe. 6 Seeing no other choice, Ms. A.B.
fled to the United States in hopes of gaining asylum.7 In December
of 2016, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or “the Board”)
granted Ms. A.B. asylum.8 Two years later, this decision was
vacated.9

†. J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Minnesota Law School; B.B.A. 2017,
University of Wisconsin-Madison. I’d like to thank Prof. Chan, Prof. Casper Sanchez,
and the JLI staff for their guidance and corrections. I’d also like to thank Will Shirey,
my family, and my friends. Finally, I’d like to thank the Immigration and Human
Rights Clinic for giving me a group with which to lament about the immigration
system and for allowing me to work with the clients who helped to inspire this Note.
“Do not deprive the foreigner . . . of justice.” Deuteronomy 24:17.
1. Backgrounder and Briefing on Matter of A-B-, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE
STUDIES, https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/matter-b/backgrounder-and-briefing-matter-b
[https://perma.cc/P6MS-TLW5].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 340 (A.G. 2018).
9. Id.
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After running a campaign largely focused on restricting
immigration and strengthening border control, Donald Trump
entered office and began to implement policies in furtherance of
those ends.10 Anti-immigration sentiment was also propagated by
the officials appointed to leadership positions by the Trump
Administration, including former Attorney General Jeff Sessions. 11
To further this anti-immigration agenda, in the summer of 2018,
Sessions issued a groundbreaking policy decision in In re A-B-,
narrowing the interpretation of a particular social group (PSG),
particularly for survivors of “private crimes,” namely domestic and
gang violence.12 This ruling reversed the grant of Ms. A.B.’s asylum
because of perceived error in the Board’s standard of review.13 On a
larger scale, this ruling reversed a more lenient interpretation of
PSGs for survivors of domestic violence. 14 Since this ruling, there
has been much uncertainty about whether and how survivors of
domestic violence can obtain asylum status in the United States. 15
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
created an international obligation to assist those who fit the
10. See generally David D. Sussman, Immigration, Trump, and Agenda-Setting
in the 2016 Election, 41 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 75 (2017) (examining Donald
Trump’s immigration policy strategy in the 2016 election).
11. Ryan T. Beckwith, ‘We Cannot Admit Everyone.’ Read a Transcript of Jeff
Sessions’ Remarks on Ending the DACA Program, TIME (Sept. 5, 2017),
http://time.com/4927426/daca-dreamers-jeff-sessions-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/3
U98-S8NF].
12. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 343–44. In this Note, I choose to refer to
individuals who have faced domestic violence as ’survivors.’ However, at times this
Note will refer to the same group as ‘victims,’ primarily when quoting other sources.
These terms should be understood interchangeably.
13. Dree K. Collopy et al., Matter of A-B-: Case Updates, Current Trends, and
Suggested Strategies, AM. IMMIGRATION LAW ASS’N (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.aila.
org/infonet/matter-of-a-b-case-updates-current-trends
[https://perma.cc/RV3P7GC4].
14. Nolan Rappaport, Domestic Abuse Decision Doesn’t Change Asylum Law,
Just Applies It Correctly, HILL (June 15, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/
immigration/392409-sessions-domestic-abuse-decision-didnt-change-asylum-lawjust-applied-it [https://perma.cc/59K7-4K75].
15. See, e.g., NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., ASYLUM PRACTICE ADVISORY:
APPLYING FOR ASYLUM AFTER MATTER OF A-B- (2018), http://immigrantjustice.org/s
ites/default/files/content-type/resource/documents/2018-09/Matter%20of%20A-B%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%20Final%20-%2006.18_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/22D
Q-6JEB]; BLAINE BOOKEY, MATTER OF A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), CTR. FOR
GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES (June 22, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/conte
nt/dam/aba/administrative/crsj/committee/matter-of-a-b-webinar_6-22-2018
.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/58F4-AWSY]; Reena Arya, DHS Clarifies Its
Guidance on Matter of A-B-, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC. (July 30,
2018, 8:00 PM), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/dhs-clarifies-its-guidance-matter-b
[https://perma.cc/GZH2-RSE2].
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definition of a “refugee.”16 The relationship between this obligation
and the treatment of survivors of domestic violence has proven to
be complicated.17 Asylum is not meant to be an option for anyone in
a difficult situation, but rather, an option for people who have been
persecuted on account of their membership of a particular category
outlined in the U.S. Code, such as race, religion, or PSG.18 Survivors
of domestic violence have fit the definition of “refugee” through the
PSG category. However, the standard for analyzing this category
has shifted repeatedly, resulting in uncertainty for survivors
seeking asylum.19
This dilemma likely resulted, in part, because of the evolution
of this category. Historically, PSGs related to “private crimes”
typically involved individuals associated with gangs. 20 Because
these individuals were often seen as unsavory characters, a
narrower interpretation of the PSG standard as opposed to the
asylum categories faced little backlash. However, as more claims
were made by survivors of domestic violence under the PSG
category, this narrow interpretation started to appear cruel.
Balancing the views toward these groups and the relationship
between the obligation to refugees and the treatment of survivors
of domestic violence has resulted in complications due to the moral
obligation felt towards survivors.21 The backlash following In re AB-, for example, has shown that there is a general idea, among the
public, that survivors of domestic violence should have the
opportunity to enter the United States through the asylum
system.22 However, balancing this moral mindset with the standard
set forth to determine asylum eligibility has resulted in
16. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
17. Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206
Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.
107, 147–48 (2013) (noting that “whether a woman fleeing domestic violence will
receive protection in the United States seems to depend not on the consistent
application of objective principles, but rather on the view of her individual judge,
often untethered to any legal principles at all”).
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018).
19. Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE
L.J. 2512, 2537 (2014).
20. See Christopher C. Malwitz, Particular Social Groups: Vague Definitions and
an Indeterminate Future for Asylum Seekers, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2018).
21. Marsden, supra note 19.
22. Ted Hesson & Josh Gerstein, Sessions Moves to Block Asylum for Most
Victims of Domestic, Gang Violence, POLITICO (June 11, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://www
.politico.com/story/2018/06/11/jeff-sessions-aslyum-standards-domestic-violence614158 [https://perma.cc/65EA-3NN2].
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unpredictable treatment of this group.23 In re A-B- exemplifies a
recent narrowing of this standard. 24 This restructuring resulted in
immigration judges applying a narrower standard to claims
involving PSGs than to the other categories eligible for asylum.
The shaping of this standard began with In re Acosta, the first
case to examine PSGs.25 Acosta, which set out a broad standard to
determine PSG eligibility, simply required that the PSG be defined
by an “immutable” characteristic.26 However, this standard was
narrowed over time, and a three-part test was eventually
implemented to determine asylum eligibility within the PSG
category.27 This test requires that an applicant “establish that the
group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially
distinct within the society in question.” 28 These elements,
particularly the elements of “socially distinct” and “particularity,”
have caused confusion in various courts and have often resulted in
overly harsh rulings.29 These rulings have been especially apparent
with regard to survivors of gang violence.30 Survivors of domestic
violence, on the other hand, had, until recently, received a more
lenient interpretation, as showcased in In re A-R-C-G-.31 However,
Sessions’ ruling in In re A-B- overrules this lenient standard. 32
Sessions, like many arbiters before him, confused and conflated the
elements necessary to satisfy a PSG and consequently instituted an
incorrect and overly harsh standard for survivors of private crimes.
23. Compare In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on
other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987), with In re ME-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (B.I.A. 2014).
24. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 340 (A.G. 2018).
25. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
26. Id.
27. Malwitz, supra note 20 (explaining how the three-element test for PSG was
established in the cases In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014), and In re ME-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227).
28. In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 208; In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 227.
29. Nicholas R. Bednar, Social Group Semantics: The Evidentiary Requirements
of “Particularity” and “Social Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications, 100
MINN. L. REV. 355 (2015); Clay Venetis, A Catch-22? The Social Distinction
Requirement for Asylum, PROCEEDINGS (Mar. 21, 2017), https://proceedings.nyumoo
tcourt.org/2017/03/a-catch-22-the-social-distinction-requirement-for-asylum/
[https://perma.cc/CN5M-3L57].
30. Tina Zedginidze, Domestic Abuse and Gang Violence Against Women:
Expanding the Particular Social Group Finding in Matter of A-R-C-G- to Grant
Asylum to Women Persecuted by Gangs, 34 LAW & INEQ. 221, 236 (2016).
31. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014) (recognizing “married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” as a particular
social group).
32. Id.; In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 340 (A.G. 2018).
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Part I of this Note considers the requirements for falling under
the PSG category when making an asylum claim, including the shift
from the Acosta standard to the three-part test. Part II looks at the
history of PSG interpretations regarding asylum claims made by
survivors of domestic violence. Part III then considers the three
main portions in the recent In re A-B- ruling. Finally, Part IV
contends that In re A-B- conflated the factors necessary to prove a
PSG and therefore exemplifies that the requirements of “socially
distinct” and “particularity” have done more to confuse, rather than
clarify, the requirements necessary to establish a PSG. Using this
contention, this Note then argues that these two requirements
should be abolished and that the Acosta standard should be
reinstated.
Sessions’ ruling in In re A-B- creates a harsh standard for
survivors of domestic violence coming to the United States in hopes
of gaining asylum status. This ruling was a misapplication of the
analysis for the PSG category due to confusion and conflation
caused by the “particularity” and “socially distinct” factors.
Furthermore, this Note uses In re A-B- to demonstrate why these
two requirements should be abolished and explains how a reversion
to the Acosta standard will lead to a more consistent and correct
implementation of the PSG category, as it will afford applicants in
the PSG category the same process rights as individuals seeking
asylum under other categories.
I.

A Brief History of the “Particular Social Group”
Category for Asylum Claims
A.

The Requirements for an Asylum Claim and the Acosta
Standard

A non-citizen refugee qualifies for asylum in the United
States.33 The Immigration and Nationality Act defines a “refugee”
as “any person . . . who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion[.]”34 Though each category has its
blurred edges and exceptions, there has been much debate and
confusion as to what constitutes a PSG in particular.
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018).
34. Id.
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In 1985, the BIA addressed the category of PSG for the first
time in its decision In re Acosta.35 The BIA created a standard that
stood until around the turn of the century.36 In the Acosta case, the
asylee claimed to be a member of the PSG of taxi drivers who
refused to take part in guerrilla-sponsored work stoppages.37 The
BIA implemented the interpretive cannon of ejusdem generis (“of
the same kind”) and consequently construed PSG in relation to, and
consistent with, the other four categories eligible for asylum.38 It
found each other category to be a type of immutable characteristic,
meaning the characteristic is “either beyond the power of an
individual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or
conscience that it ought not be required to be changed.”39 Applying
that idea to PSG, the BIA found it meant “persecution that is
directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons
all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.” 40 The BIA
noted that shared past experiences or innate characteristics, even
specifically pointing to “sex” as such a characteristic, could define a
PSG.41 The BIA found this definition to be sufficient as it ensured
equality between the categories of individuals seeking asylum and
ensured that a “refugee is restricted to individuals who are either
unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should not
be required, to avoid persecution.”42
B.

The Three-Element Test

The creation of a category which potentially allows broad
groups, such as those based on gender alone, created a fear of an
opening of a floodgate of asylum claims for members of PSGs. 43
Though the other groups eligible for asylum were not narrowed,
courts responded to this fear and began to narrow the PSG

35. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
36. Benjamin Casper et al., Matter of M-E-V-G- and the BIA’s Confounding Legal
Standard for “Membership in a Particular Social Group”, 14-06 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS
1, 4 (2014).
37. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 216–17.
38. Id. at 233.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 234.
43. See generally Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution:
Fear of Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119 (2007)
(arguing that this fear is unfounded because acceptance of gender asylum has
historically not given rise to a dramatic increase in the number of asylum claims).
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category.44 In In re R-A-, the BIA denied asylum to an individual
with a strong claim of domestic abuse. 45 Though this case was
eventually vacated, it signaled a shift in the BIA’s attitude and its
initial distancing from Acosta.46
Attempting to clarify the PSG standard, In re C-A- introduced
the idea of “social visibility.”47 In re C-A- equated “social visibility”
with recognizability, noting that “[s]ocial groups based on innate
characteristics such as sex or family relationship are generally
easily recognizable and understood by others to constitute social
groups.”48 The Board claimed this idea was consistent with the
Acosta standard.49 But confusion persisted, so the BIA again
attempted to clarify the standard through In re A-M-E- & J-G-U- in
which the BIA implemented both the “social visibility” and the
“particularity” requirements into the PSG analysis.50 It created and
interpreted the “particularity” requirement standard to necessitate
an “adequate benchmark for determining group membership.” 51 For
example, the BIA found “wealthy” too “subjective, inchoate, and
variable” to meet that standard.52 In 2008, the BIA ruled in In re SE-G- and in In re E-A-G-, officially adding “social visibility” and
“particularity” to the Acosta standard of a “common immutable
characteristic” and creating a three-part test to determine a PSG.53
The Board claimed that such requirements would provide
specificity and clarification to the Acosta standard, though it failed
to address that this heightened standard created a narrower
standard than the standard applied to other categories eligible for
asylum.54

44. Helen P. Grant, The Floodgates Are Not Going to Open, but Will the U.S.
Border?, 29 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1, 36 (2006).
45. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 2001) (vacating the BIA’s 1999
decision).
46. Casper et al., supra note 36.
47. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006) (rejecting “noncriminal drug
informants working against the Cali drug cartel” as a particular social group).
48. Id. at 959.
49. Id. at 956.
50. In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007) (denying “wealthy
Guatemalans” as a particular social group).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. This test requires that an applicant “establish that the group is (1)
composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined
with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Malwitz,
supra note 20, at 1150.
54. Id.
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Though many Circuits fully adopted this three-part test,55 in
other courts it resulted in skepticism and varying
implementations.56 The Seventh Circuit rejected the “social
visibility” requirement, as it found such a requirement arbitrary
and inconsistent with its earlier decisions. 57 The Third Circuit also
failed to see how the idea of “social visibility” would be consistent
with the Board’s prior decisions and, seeing no rationale for such a
requirement, refused to adopt this requirement. 58 The Third Circuit
viewed “particularity” as just another way of requiring “social
visibility” and subsequently refused to adopt that requirement as
well.59 These circuit splits demonstrate that these requirements are
unnecessary and confusing. The three-part standard and split of
authority has thus left a gap for further clarification.
C.

In re M-E-V-G- Attempted to Clarify the Socially Visible
Requirement

In 2014, the Board again hoped to clarify the area of PSG with
its opinion in In re M-E-V-G-.60 This case involved the PSG of
“Honduran youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but
who have refused to join because they oppose the gangs.” 61 In
attempting to clarify the requirements of a PSG, this case renamed
the “socially visible” requirement to “socially distinct,” as the group
need not be actually visible.62 To meet this requirement, the PSG
must be perceived as a group by society, rather than by the
persecutor.63 The Board made this distinction because it found that
considering the persecutor’s perception would conflate the PSG
membership requirement with the nexus requirement.64 Looking at
“particularity,” the Board considered whether the group had
discrete boundaries, as the group should not be “amorphous,
overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”65 The Board never issued a final

55. Casper et al., supra note 36 (noting that the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits deferred to the three-part test “in full.”).
56. In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-,4 I. & N. Dec. 69.
57. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009).
58. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 603–07 (3d Cir. 2011).
59. Id.
60. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014).
61. Id. at 228.
62. Id. at 236.
63. Id. at 242.
64. Id. at 242.
65. Id. at 239.
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decision on M-E-V-G-’s status.66 Instead, it once again attempted to
clarify the interpretation standard and then remanded the case to
the immigration judge.67 The standard set forth in In re M-E-V-G(that perception by society, not the persecutor, is what matters) was
specifically referenced in In re A-B-.68 However, despite the court’s
decision in In re M-E-V-G- attempt to prevent it, Sessions ignored
that distinction and instead focused on the perception of the
persecutor.69
From Acosta to In re M-E-V-G-, the standard used to determine
a PSG has shifted repeatedly over time. This has resulted in
uncertainty for survivors of domestic violence seeking asylum in the
United States. This shifting has also resulted in a narrower
interpretation of the PSG category as compared to the other
categories eligible for asylum, making it more difficult for victims of
domestic violence to gain asylum compared to the other eligible
groups.70 Returning to the Acosta standard would provide stability
and certainty to applicants under the PSG and ensure that they are
given the same opportunity for asylum as those applying under
other categories.
II. The Interpretation of a Particular Social Group in
Relation to Domestic Violence Claims
A.

In re R-A- Begins a Movement of Stricter Scrutiny of
Domestic Violence Survivors as Refugees

First considered in 1999, In re R-A- created an uproar after
denying asylum to an individual, despite evidence showing that she
had endured severe domestic abuse, as she had not shown “that the
victims of spouse abuse view themselves as members of this group,
nor, most importantly, that their male oppressors see their
victimized companions as part of this group.” 71 Eventually vacated,
this decision led to an intense scrutinization of when survivors of
domestic violence could satisfy the requirements of PSG. 72 When
considering this new case, the Department of Homeland Security
66. Id. at 253.
67. Id.
68. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 330 (A.G. 2018).
69. Id. at 339.
70. See id. at 339–40.
71. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918 (B.I.A. 2001) (vacating the BIA’s 1999
decision).
72. Casper et al., supra note 36.
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(DHS) looked at immutability as the key factor, but also considered
a variety of other factors.73 The DHS found that “married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship” 74 met the
Acosta standard because the group was united by two immutable
characteristics, gender and relationship status (immutable due to
cultural constraints).75 The DHS also noted that the size of a group
was irrelevant when deciding whether it was cognizable, but that
size should be considered when contemplating the nexus.76 The
applicant was denied asylum in In re R-A-, but she did eventually
receive asylum status with the agreement of DHS in 2010. 77 In the
meantime, however, In re R-A- had led to widespread uncertainty
and criticism of the PSG standards. 78 In hopes of reducing this
uncertainty, the idea of “social visibility” was introduced in the In
re C-A- decision in 2006.79 Soon after, the “social visibility” and
“particularity” requirements were added to the Acosta standard of
a “common immutable characteristic,” creating the three-part test
for a PSG.80
B.

DHS’s Brief in In re L-R- Allowed More Labels to
Successfully Define a PSG

Decided in 2009, in In re L-R-, DHS’s brief rejected the PSG of
“Mexican women in an abusive domestic relationship who are
unable to leave” because it was “impermissibly ‘circular.’” 81
However, DHS’s brief noted that the PSGs of “Mexican women in
domestic relationships who are unable to leave” and “Mexican
women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions
within a domestic relationship” would be sufficient. 82 First, DHS
allowed that gender and a woman’s status in a relationship may be
“immutable.”83 Next, considering the “socially visible” prong, DHS
suggested an objective perception standard, which could be
evidenced by a societal view that “the status of a woman in a
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
2009).
82.
83.

In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 917–19; see also Casper supra note 36.
Casper et al., supra note 36.
In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 911.
Casper et al., supra note 36, at 7.
Id.
Id.
In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–61 (B.I.A. 2006).
See infra text accompanying note 105.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Supplemental Brief at 10–11, In re L-R- (B.I.A.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
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domestic relationship places the woman into a segment of society
that will not be accorded protection from harm inflicted by a
domestic partner.”84 Finally, looking at “particularity,” DHS saw it
could be met if the record showed the group of persons in domestic
relationships was adequately defined.85 DHS recognized a sufficient
nexus if the persecutor understood that the survivor was unable to
escape or receive protection from the government. 86 “[G]ender and
status in a relationship, status in the family, and/or status in society
can define a social group that fulfills all the current social group
requirements.”87 As long as applicants met the three factors, this
brief required that DHS representatives find that survivors of
domestic violence could meet the necessary standard to show
membership in a PSG.88
C.

Cece v. Holder89 Marked Triumph for Gender-Based
Asylum Claims

The idea that survivors of domestic violence could make
successful asylum claims was exhibited again in Cece v. Holder.
Decided by the Seventh Circuit in 2013, Cece v. Holder recognized
“young Albanian women living alone” as a PSG. 90 In this case, Cece
feared being kidnapped by an infamous prostitution ring after being
followed around town, offered rides, and invited on dates by a leader
of the ring.91 As the Seventh Circuit had not adopted the
“particularity” and “socially distinct” requirements, the court
applied the Acosta standard rather than the three-part test.92 The
court found Cece’s age, gender, nationality, and living status to be
immutable characteristics, therefore meeting the Acosta
standard.93 In its analysis, the court explained how a group can be
defined in part by persecution, as long as that is not the group’s sole
defining characteristic.94 The court also addressed the fear of the
84. Id. at 17–18.
85. Id. at 18–19 (considering how a country’s laws may define a domestic
relationship).
86. Id. at 20–22.
87. Matter of L-R-, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, https://cgrs.uchasti
ngs.edu/our-work/matter-l-r [https://perma.cc/RL8B-XE5N].
88. Id.
89. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 673 (7th Cir. 2013).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 666.
92. Id. at 669.
93. Id. at 672.
94. Id.
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floodgates opening due to an over-broad PSG interpretation.95 The
court astutely noted that group membership is only one step in a
series of requirements for gaining asylum status and, therefore, the
definition of PSG itself need not be overly burdensome. 96 This case
applied the asylum category of PSG consistently with the standards
used for the other categories eligible for asylum and allowed for fair
and straightforward analysis.
D.

In re A-R-C-G- Appeared to Recognize Once and for All
that Survivors of Domestic Violence Can Qualify for
Asylum

Decided in 2014, In re A-R-C-G- recognized “married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” as a PSG. 97
The Board, remaining consistent with Acosta, found gender to be a
common immutable characteristic sufficient to create a PSG. 98 It
also found marital status to be an immutable characteristic where
the individual is “unable to leave the relationship.” 99 The
“particularity” requirement was also met, as the terms defining the
group “have commonly accepted definition[s] within Guatemalan
society.”100 The PSG was found to meet the requirement of “socially
distinct” as the country has a “culture of ‘machismo and family
violence’” and because, although there were laws prohibiting such
violence, enforcement of those laws was “problematic.”101 The Board
found that the respondent had suffered harm rising to the level of
past persecution, that she was a member of a qualifying PSG, and
that her membership was a central reason for her persecution. 102
This case is viewed as unambiguously establishing that survivors of
domestic violence could qualify for asylum in the United States. 103
However, this view was soon challenged, resulting in inconsistent
applications of the asylum standard and continuing uncertainty for
survivors of domestic violence.
95. Id. at 675.
96. Id.
97. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B,
27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
98. Id. at 392–93.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 393.
101. Id. at 394.
102. Id. at 394–95.
103. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 128 HARV. L. REV.: IMMIGR. 2090, 2090 (2015)
https://harvardlawreview.org/2015/05/matter-of-a-r-c-g/
[https://perma.cc/EB7J95F4].
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III. In re A-B- Limited the Ability of Domestic Violence
Survivors to Gain Asylum
On June 11, 2018, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions made
a precedential ruling in In re A-B-, overruling In re A-R-C-G- and
narrowing the interpretation of a PSG, making it more difficult for
survivors of private crimes, like domestic violence, to gain
asylum.104 In his ruling, Sessions applied the three-part test for
identifying a PSG.105 Sessions’ focus in this decision was on
“whether, and under what circumstances, being a victim of private
criminal activity constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’
for purposes of an application for asylum or withholding of
removal.”106 Sessions stated that applicants seeking to fit within
such a group
must establish membership in a particular and socially distinct
group that exists independently of the alleged underlying harm,
demonstrate that their persecutors harmed them on account of
their membership in that group rather than for personal
reasons, and establish that the government protection from
such harm in their home country is so lacking that their
persecutors’ actions can be attributed to the government.107

A.

Overruling In re A-R-C-G-

In re A-B- overruled In re A-R-C-G-, claiming that In re
A-R-C-G- had failed to undertake the necessary legal and factual
analyses and created confusion because of its expansive recognition
of PSG based on private violence.108 In overruling In re A-R-C-G-,
Sessions emphasized the idea that a PSG cannot be defined by its
persecution.109 In doing so, he viewed the group of “married women
in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” as
“effectively defined to consist of women in Guatemala who are
victims of domestic abuse because the inability ‘to leave’ was
created by harm or threatened harm.” 110 The Board’s “particularity”
104. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (A.G. 2018).
105. Id. at 317 (stating that the applicant must demonstrate “membership in a
group, which is composed of members who share a common immutable
characteristic, is defined with particularity, and is socially distinct within the society
in question.”).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 319.
109. Id. at 335.
110. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 335 (A.G. 2018).
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standard was also questioned by Sessions, who argued a commonly
understood definition was insufficient, as not every characteristic is
precise enough to define a PSG. 111 In the analysis used to overrule
In re A-R-C-G-, Sessions conflated the factors used to determine a
PSG and further narrowed the PSG standard.
B.

Looking at the Facts

Sessions then looked at the facts brought by Ms. A.B., who
presented the PSG of “‘El Salvadoran women who are unable to
leave their domestic relationships where they have children in
common’ with their partners.”112 This description seemed to mirror
the standard brought forth in In re R-A- (“married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship”) and the
standard noted in In re L-R- (“Mexican women in domestic
relationships who are unable to leave”) both of which were found
sufficient to meet the Acosta standard by the BIA.113 When
considering the requirements, Sessions noted that a fine line must
be walked between defining narrow classes as to meet the
“particularity” requirement while still providing sufficient social
distinction to be cognizable as a “socially distinct” group. 114 He
stated, “[a] particular social group must avoid . . . being too broad to
have definable boundaries and too narrow to have larger
significance in society.”115 This response represents a notably
stricter standard than those necessary for other categories eligible
for asylum.
Sessions found that the Board had erred in finding a nexus
between Ms. A.B.’s harm and her group membership, as Ms. A.B.
failed to point to any evidence of her husband’s abuse on account of
her membership in the claimed group.116 He stated further, “[t]he
Board cited no evidence that her husband knew any such social
group existed, or that he persecuted wife [sic] for reasons unrelated
to their relationship.”117 Sessions also found that the Board had

111. Id. (finding that In re A-R-C-G- held the particularity standard was met
because the group had “commonly accepted definitions within Guatemalan society,”
and that In re A-R-C-G-’s analysis was insufficient).
112. Id. at 321.
113. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Supplemental Brief at 4, 14–15, In re L-R- (B.I.A.
2009) (quoting language from In re A-B-).
114. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 336.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 343.
117. Id.
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erred in finding that the government was unwilling or unable to
protect Ms. A.B.118
C.

Moving Forward

Sessions then set out a framework by which to present PSG
claims moving forward, stating that, “an applicant seeking asylum
or withholding of removal based on membership in a particular
social group must clearly indicate . . . the exact delineation of any
proposed particular social group.”119 In concluding his opinion,
Sessions noted that the previous interpretations of PSG put the
category at risk of becoming too lax and creating a catch-all category
for individuals who failed to fit into another group. 120 He then
remanded the case to the immigration judge for further
proceedings.121
The consequences of this recent opinion are still being worked
out. Many have expressed deep concern for its impact. A group of
former immigration judges claim that this case was not properly
before the Attorney General and therefore should have never been
decided in the first place.122 A group of religious organizations filed
an amicus brief sharing its concern that such a ruling could have
disastrous effects on survivors of religious persecution, as such
individuals could be seen as survivors of “private criminal
activity.”123 A third amicus brief argued that this ruling
unnecessarily narrowed the category of PSG, when such a category
should actually be expanded.124
Courts’ applications of this analysis have varied.125 Several
courts have continued to issue decisions accepting asylum claims by
survivors of gang or domestic violence.126 The Ninth Circuit has
determined that this ruling is not a categorical foreclosure of

118. Id.
119. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 344.
120. Id. at 346.
121. Id.
122. Brief for Former Immigration Judges et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, supra note 104, at 9–12.
123. Brief for Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. et al. as Amicus Curiae,
supra note 107, at 4.
124. Brief for Harvard Immigration & Refugee Clinical Program et al. as Amicus
Curiae, supra note 107, at 6 (arguing that gender alone should satisfy a particular
social group).
125. Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, Post-Matter of A-B- Litigation Update:
CGRS Practice Advisory (Dec. 2018) (on file with author).
126. Id. at 3.
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gender-based asylum claims.127 In August of 2018, the ACLU filed
a claim in Grace v. Whitaker, successfully challenging the
application of In re A-B- in credible fear proceedings.128 Grace v.
Whitaker, though primarily focused on the credible fear
proceedings, signaled that In re A-B- should not be used as a blanket
denial of asylum claims for survivors of domestic violence and
signals that harsh applications of the PSG standard will be
challenged.129 Furthermore, in the public eye, In re A-B- created a
morality crisis as it failed to protect a vulnerable group.130
In re A-B- still stands and its meaning continues to be
elaborated upon and shaped by each asylum claim brought forward.
But slight variations and reinterpretations here and there will not
fix the issue. Instead, the standard used to determine a PSG should
be overhauled by returning to Acosta. By simplifying the standard
and applying it consistently with the standard used for other
categories of asylum eligibility, the courts can promote consistency
and certainty in the asylum system.
IV. The In re A-B- Decision Exemplifies How the
Requirements of “Socially Distinct” and “Particularity”
Confuse, Rather than Clarify, What Constitutes a
Particular Social Group
The analysis brought forward by former Attorney General Jeff
Sessions dealt with a variety of issues, the most impactful being its
127. Id. at 3–4.
128. Dree K. Collopy et al., Matter of A-B-: Case Updates, Current Trends, and
Suggested Strategies, AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, (Feb. 8, 2019),
https://www.aila.org/infonet/matter-of-a-b-case-updates-current-trends [https://per
ma.cc/Y4C6-UEBV]. Credible fear interviews are conducted by United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for individuals in expedited removal
proceedings. In these interviews, the applicant attempts to establish that they have
been persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution based on the previously
mentioned categories (race, religion, PSG, etc.). If an applicant are found to have a
credible fear, they may seek asylum before an immigration judge. If an applicant is
not not found to have a credible fear, they can either seek review by an immigration
judge or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) may remove you from the
United States. Questions & Answers: Credible Fear Screening, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum
/questions-answers-credible-fear-screening [https://perma.cc/YF3D-Q8WX].
129. Collopy et al., supra note 128.
130. Joel Rose, As More Migrants Are Denied Asylum, an Abuse Survivor Is
Turned Away, NPR, (Jan. 18, 2019) https://www.npr.org/2019/01/18/686466207/itsgetting-harder-for-migrants-to-win-asylum-cases-lawyers-say
[https://perma.cc/357Q-9J3H].
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analysis of a PSG in an asylum claim by a survivor of domestic
violence. In his analysis, Sessions elucidated the history of
interpretations regarding what constitutes a PSG. 131 He recognized
there was uncertainty regarding this standard and sought to clarify
it by overruling a case he believed to be inconsistent with the
accepted standard and by promoting guidelines to apply to the
interpretation of a PSG.132 His application of these guidelines and
the standards he believed to be correct were also meant to guide
PSG determinations moving forward.133
This analysis made asylum prospects for survivors of private
crimes, namely gang violence and domestic violence, much
grimmer. It was also incorrect. Sessions’ application of the
requirements of “particularity” and “socially distinct” conflated
various standards, making his ruling arbitrarily contrary to prior
cases and thus improper. Therefore, this case should be viewed as
an example of the confusion caused by these additional standards
and this case serves as an argument as to why the Acosta standard
should be re-implemented as the leading standard for determining
a PSG.
A.

i.

Where the “Socially Distinct” and “Particularity”
Requirements Led to Conflation Rather than
Clarification in In re A-BConflating How Society Views a PSG with How the
Persecutor Views a PSG

When determining a PSG, the analysis requires a clear
distinction between how the persecutor views the group and how
society perceives the group.134 As noted above, this distinction was
made clear in In re M-E-V-G-, which stated that the PSG must be
perceived as a group by society, rather than by the persecutor, as
considering the perception of the persecutor would conflate the PSG
membership requirement with the nexus requirement.135 This
consideration would also risk defining the group by the harm
caused. In re M-E-V-G- anticipated the risk of conflating these two
perceptions and made it clear that the focus should be on how the
131. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 317 (A.G. 2018).
132. Id. at 317, 344.
133. Id. at 344.
134. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 236 (B.I.A. 2014) (explaining that the
PSG must be perceived as a group by society, rather than by the persecutor).
135. Id.
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group is perceived by society. 136 Yet, Sessions ignored this
distinction and considered the PSG through the lens of the
persecutor rather than through the lens of society.
Sessions recognized the correct standard in his analysis, yet
continued to focus on the perspective of the persecutor: “The Board
cited no evidence that her husband knew any such social group
existed . . . .”137 He also relied heavily on the case of In re R-A-,
which was erroneous for two main reasons.138 First, this case was
vacated by the Attorney General in 2001 and should therefore not
be relied on as precedent.139 Second, this case relied heavily on the
persecutor’s perception of the group, which, as stated in In re
M-E-V-G-, is the incorrect lens through which to consider asylum
claims.140 When determining if a PSG is valid, it is unnecessary to
consider the perspective of the persecutor. Rather, that factor is
considered when analyzing the “on account of” standard. 141 By
considering the PSG from the perspective of the persecutor,
Sessions conflated the factors of PSG and “on account of” and
inaccurately applied the multi-part test.
ii.

Defining the PSG by the Persecution Suffered

The second crucial mistake made by Sessions was the
conflation of the persecution with the label of the PSG. A PSG
cannot by defined solely by the persecution suffered. 142 Sessions
specifically notes this rule in his analysis. 143 However, he ignores
this rule in the application of Ms. A.B.’s facts and conflates the
ideas. This ignorance is made apparent through the phrasing of his
goal for his analysis: “whether, and under what circumstances,
being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a cognizable
‘particular social group’ for purposes of an application for asylum or
withholding of removal.”144 As the rule above states, the PSG cannot

136. Id.
137. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 343.
138. Id. at 329 (discussing the details of In re R-A-, which argued that the victim
had “not established that her husband has targeted and harmed [R-A-] because he
perceived her to be a member of this particular social group”) (quoting In re R-A-, 22
I. & N. Dec. 906, 920 (B.I.A. 2001) (alteration in original)).
139. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918.
140. Id. at 917.
141. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018).
142. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir. 2013).
143. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 319.
144. Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
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be defined solely by the persecution suffered.145 Therefore, the PSG
cannot be defined as ‘victims’ of anything. The issue, as framed
here, has no chance of success, as he frames the PSG brought as
victims. This reasoning misrepresents the actual PSG brought in
the case (“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave
their relationship”).146
This PSG label is not as unambiguous as Sessions claims it to
be, as it is not clearly defined by the harm suffered. Hypothetically,
individuals could be unable to leave their marriage for various
reasons other than their status as survivors of a criminal activity.
For example, cultural norms, familial pressures, or financial
reasons could all make an individual feel they are unable to leave a
relationship, while not being directly related to any crime. Further,
as the PSG is not defined by the harm suffered, the question
Sessions poses is inapplicable and attempts to undercut the
applicant’s claim, rather than apply the correct standard for such a
claim. Therefore, Sessions’ analysis conflates the factors necessary
for a PSG and leads to a misapplication of the standard.
iii. A Misapplication of the ‘Central Reason’ Idea
Sessions also misapplies the idea that the applicant’s
membership in the PSG must be a central reason for their
persecution. Looking at this standard, it is clear that the
membership in a PSG must be a reason for the persecution.
However, shown by using the indefinite article “a” and by not using
a definite article, “the,” or “only” in the standard, the membership
in a particular group need not be the only reason for persecution.
In his analysis, Sessions conflates these ideas and thus
propagates an incorrect standard. This misapplication is made clear
when he says, “[s]uch applicants must . . . demonstrate that their
persecutors harmed them on account of their membership in that
group rather than for personal reasons . . . .”147 The individual must
demonstrate a nexus between the persecution and the membership
in a group. However, the standard does not necessitate that the
membership be the only reason for persecution. This standard
ignores years of case law and arbitrarily narrows the standard, so
it is unattainable for many valid asylum claims.148

145.
146.
147.
148.

Cece, 733 F.3d at 673.
In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 321.
Id. at 317.
See, e.g., Cece, 733 F.3d at 662; In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 316.
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This standard particularly affects the potential for successful
asylum claims by survivors of private crimes. Many successful
claims have come out of persecution caused not only by someone
targeting a particular group, but by someone who knows the
individual personally and may even have personal reasons for
attacking that individual, in addition to that individual’s
membership in a group. For example, in Cece v. Holder, the court
found that Cece was being persecuted on account of her membership
in the PSG of “young Albanian women who live alone.” 149 The
persecutor had asked Cece out on dates which could indicate a
personal relationship.150 In fact, the persecutor, during an attack,
demanded to know why Cece would not go on a date with him. 151
Despite this potential personal relationship to the persecutor, the
court granted asylum to Cece.152 This case exemplifies how the
persecution can be based on both the membership in a PSG and
personal relations and how personal relations should not moot
claims for a member of a PSG.
In many cases, it is almost essential that the persecutor have
some personal ties to the individual they are persecuting, otherwise
they could likely not know that the person is a member of that PSG.
There are, of course, some exceptions to this idea. For example, if a
persecutor is attacking someone on the basis of the color of their
skin alone, they may have no prior knowledge of the person before
attacking them. However, most traits are not so clearly evident. For
example, in In re L-R-, the court determined PSGs of “Mexican
women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” and
“Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their
positions within a domestic relationship” to be sufficient PSGs.153 A
member of either of these groups would not be clearly identifiable
as such a member when walking down the street, yet the Board
found both groups to meet the necessary standards for PSG. 154 This
result is also exemplified by two well-accepted categories of traits
for which a person can be persecuted outside of PSG, specifically,
religion and political belief.155 Though such characteristics may be
made obvious through appearance, for example, by the wearing of a
cross or the wearing of a particular red hat, not every individual

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Cece, 733 F.3d at 673.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 683.
See Brief for DHS as supplement, supra note 82, at 143.
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (2018).
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with a successful claim has been attacked solely while wearing such
a symbol. Rather, a persecutor likely has some prior experience with
the individual, allowing the persecutor to understand the
persecuted’s beliefs, thus leading to the persecution on account of
such a belief. This prior meeting makes the attack fundamentally
personal.
iv. Pervasiveness Need Not Exclude Persecution
In his analysis, Sessions pointed to the idea that if a
persecution is widespread or felt by various portions of society, it is
invalid. This implication was made clear through the idea that
individuals who are affected by gang violence cannot make
successful asylum claims as “victims of gang violence come from all
segments of society.”156 And again, “[t]he pervasive nature of this
violent criminality . . . suggested that membership in a purported
particular social group ‘is often not a central reason for the threats
received . . .’”157 This analysis propagates the idea that if
persecution is too widely experienced, it can invalidate an asylum
claim.
However, the fact that a wide variety of people face a certain
persecution should not render their experience of that persecution
invalid. This misunderstanding oversimplifies what it means to be
human. An individual is not defined by a single demographic
characteristic. Looking at some of the more seemingly clear
categories, characteristics can clearly cross borders. There are
Christians of every age, Democrats in various tax brackets, and
LGBTQ+ individuals from a variety of nationalities. It is well
recognized that an individual is not limited to associate with only
those exactly like them. For example, individuals from other
categories eligible for asylum, like those with a particular religious
or political belief, are still eligible for asylum even though they come
from a variety of backgrounds or social settings. This same level of
acceptance should also be available for members of a PSG. The
inclusion in one category should not disqualify an individual from
another. When determining eligibility for asylum, the PSG brought
forward for the claim should be noted as just one characteristic of
who that person is, and not the basis of their entire identity.

156. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 322 (2018).
157. Id. at 323 (quoting Velasquez v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 188, 199 (4th Cir. 2017)).
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V. Avoiding Conflation and Preserving Independence:
Why Acosta Is the Correct Standard
A.

How the Acosta Standard Avoids the Conflation Risks
Faced under the Three-Part Test

Though the three-part test used to determine a valid PSG was
created with the intent to clarify the Acosta standard, in reality, it
only further complicated the standard and resulted in inconsistent
and incorrect rulings. It also made the PSG category demand a
stricter standard than the other categories, as it added additional
qualifications to the ejusdem generis interpretation. Therefore, to
ensure a level playing field and create more certainty in the asylum
field, the Acosta standard should be reinstated.
To exemplify the clarity the Acosta standard would provide, it
is helpful to consider the analysis in In re A-R-C-G-. The PSG
brought forward in In re A-R-C-G- was “married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.” 158 In the
analysis, the Board found that “marital status can be an immutable
characteristic where the individual is unable to leave the
relationship.”159 Applying the Acosta standard, this group would
therefore meet the immutable characteristic standard and be
deemed a valid PSG.
However, more analysis was deemed necessary, which is
where the confusion began. The Board in In re A-R-C-G- found the
PSG to be valid under the three-part test as well, but Sessions
disagreed as he found the PSG to be “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse,
or subjective.”160 This split exemplifies how the three-part standard
can lead to inconsistent decisions.
Sessions also stated that “not every ‘immutable characteristic’
is sufficiently precise to define a particular social group.” 161 This
response appears to contradict the Acosta standard, which simply
requires that the characteristic be immutable and allows the
characteristic to be as broad as an individual’s sex. 162 Though the
three-part test claims to be consistent with the Acosta standard, it
is not. Instead, it arbitrarily heightens the standard by creating
additional guidelines not present in the other categories. This
158. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by
In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
159. Id. at 392–93.
160. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 335 (quoting In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
227, 239 (B.I.A. 2014)).
161. In re A-B-, I. & N. Dec. at 335 (quoting In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. at 239).
162. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
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arbitrarily fortifies the PSG category as compared to the other
groups and leads to inconsistent analyses and rulings. To resolve
these inconsistencies, the Acosta standard should be reinstated.
B.

How In re A-B- Would Result Under the Acosta Standard

Though not all of the specific facts from In re A-B- are known,
an application of the known facts considered under the Acosta
standard is a helpful exercise. As noted above, the PSG proposed
was “El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic
relationships where they have children in common.”163 Applying the
Acosta standard, it must be determined whether this PSG qualifies
as an immutable characteristic, meaning that it “either is beyond
the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to
individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be
changed.”164 Both innate characteristics as well as shared past
experiences were sufficient to meet the PSG standard in Acosta.165
Ms. A-B-’s PSG would therefore be sufficient as it is based on
gender, an accepted characteristic, and it involves a characteristic
beyond the individual’s ability to change. The PSG itself makes this
clear as the label itself involves an inability to change (“unable to
leave”). Therefore, this PSG meets the Acosta standard for PSG.
Prior cases involving similar PSGs support that Ms. A.B.
meets the Acosta standard. In In re R-A- “married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship” was deemed
sufficient under the Acosta standard.166 In In re L-R-, “Mexican
women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” was also
found to be sufficient under the Acosta standard.167 As the PSG put
forth in Ms. A.B.’s case strongly mirrors previously accepted PSGs,
it should be deemed sufficient.
However, it is important to note that the wording of the PSG
in In re A-B- was likely artificially framed because the three-part
test was the standard at the time it was created. This arbitrary
standard challenged those bringing PSG claims to create a group
that was broad enough to fulfill the “socially distinct” requirement
while also being specific enough to fulfill the “particularity”
requirement. Whereas the Board in Acosta stated that “sex” alone
163. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 343.
164. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
165. Id.
166. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918 (B.I.A. 2001) (vacating the BIA’s 1999
decision).
167. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Supplemental Brief, supra note 81, at 14.
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was enough to satisfy a PSG, 168 further attempts to clarify this
standard and narrow the meaning of PSG resulted in applicants
being forced to make up almost incoherent PSGs in order to satisfy
a standard that was not necessary in the first place. So, too, in Ms.
A.B.’s case, the PSG was likely worded more unnaturally than it
would have been under the Acosta standard in order to meet the
fine balance between the narrowness needed to meet the
particularity standard and the breadth necessary to reach the social
visibility standard. If the Acosta standard had been in place at the
time of this case, it is likely the PSG label would have been framed
differently; for example, just by the individual’s sex. According to
Acosta, such a label would be valid. Ms. A-B- would still have had
to meet the other factors necessary for asylum, but her claim would
not have been prematurely denied because of uncertainties and
balancing acts done to appease arbitrary and unnecessary rules.

C.

The Risk of Opening the Floodgates to Asylum Claims
with the Acosta Standard Is No Real Risk at All

Various courts and policymakers have expressed concerns
regarding a floodgates issue if a broader standard like Acosta is
implemented regarding asylum claims. 169 However, this worry is
unsubstantiated. In this analogy, the floodgates are the last
restraint before the water is allowed to gush in. However, a different
standard of PSG is not enough to create such a flooding of applicants
into the asylum system.
First, the Acosta standard is not a total lack of a standard, but
rather, a simpler and more reasonable standard. As stated in the
Acosta decision, this standard was created using the interpretation
tool of ejusdem generis (“of the same kind”) meaning it is held to the
same strictness as the other categories for obtaining an asylum
claim.170 Therefore, such a standard allows the same level of
scrutiny for a PSG as is allowed for the other categories. Such a
standard would also avoid a prioritization of certain groups over
others, as is currently the case.
Second, the PSG standard is just one factor in a multi-part
test. The individual must be “unable or unwilling to return to, and
168. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
169. See Musalo, supra note 43.
170. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
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is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of . . . ” a category such as a PSG.171
Therefore, an overly strict standard for the PSG factor is not only
unnecessary but it conflates, and therefore moots, the other factors
of this test. The application of the Acosta standard, on the other
hand, maintains each factor as a separate category, giving each
factor a purpose and creates a sufficiently strict and functional test
for asylum.
Under the Acosta standard, a PSG could be defined by sex
alone. However, this definition would by no means entitle every
male or female to obtain asylum in the United States. This standard
could still be difficult to meet as a survivor of domestic violence.
Proving a nexus related to this group could be difficult, but it would
not be impossible. For example, in In re A-R-C-G-, the court found
that the individual came from a country that had a “culture of
‘machismo and family violence.’”172 In In re L-R-, the court noted
that “Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their
positions within a domestic relationship” would be an eligible
PSG.173 Both of these cases recognized that a certain sex could be
seen as lesser than based on cultural norms. The existence of these
norms and the acts of an individual towards someone of a certain
sex because of these norms should be seen as satisfying the “on
account of” requirement. The framework set forth in the
Immigration and Nationality Act ensures that an individual must
meet multiple factors before receiving asylum status, thus
mitigating the fears of an opening of the floodgates. 174
In addition to the standard set out in the Immigration and
Nationality Act, there are additional barriers to meeting the
definition of a “refugee.” For example, the idea of internal relocation
as a defense creates a strong checks and balances system on asylum
claims regarding “private crimes.”175 If an individual is able to
relocate within their own country and avoid persecution, they are
not eligible for asylum.176 If an individual is facing persecution at
the hands of a small group or a single individual, internal relocation
would appear to provide a simple solution. For asylum claims, all

171. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018).
172. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 394 (B.I.A. 2014) (citation omitted),
overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
173. See supra note 81, at 14.
174. See supra text accompanying footnotes 33–34.
175. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 343–44.
176. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B).
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factors must be considered and the test as a whole, rather than the
individual factor of PSG. Considering all factors and the test as a
whole will sufficiently prevent a floodgates issue.
D.

The Acosta Standard Interprets PSGs Consistently with
the Other Eligible Categories

Sessions’ reasoning in In re A-B- narrowed the definition of a
PSG as compared to other groups. Instead of interpreting PSG
consistently, he made it more difficult for those applying under the
PSG category to make a successful claim. Sessions argued that this
narrowing is not unfair as asylum claims are just one of many
options for those fleeing harm.177 He referenced the opinion of Judge
Wilkinson, who noted that the “Board’s recent treatment of [PSG]
is ‘at risk of lacking rigor.’”178 However, this argument hints at the
idea that those seeking asylum under the category of PSG should
be treated differently than those seeking it under another category.
The standard put forward in Acosta was specifically created as a
comparison to the other categories, using the interpretive canon of
ejusdem generis in order to put all those seeking asylum on a level
playing field.179 The subsequent cases added additional
qualifications, heightening the standard for a PSG as compared to
the other categories. As each category is listed in the statute, with
no other qualifications listed for a specific group, these categories
should not be implemented using varying levels of scrutiny. Rather,
the individuals applying under each category should be treated
equally. This framework was not implemented with an idea of a
prioritization between religion versus political belief versus any
other category. Rather, those categories allow individuals from a
variety of backgrounds and situations to receive asylum. In order
that this framework is implemented with the equality that was
intended, the Acosta standard should be reinstated.
E.

Asylum to a Country where the Problem Persists

As mentioned above, there has been significant backlash
following the ruling in In re A-B-.180 Not only is Sessions’ legal
analysis concerning, but so too are the effects of this decision. This
decision has led to increased uncertainty for applicants and
individuals being deported from a place where they feel safe.

177.
178.
179.
180.

In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 345.
Id. at 346 (quoting Velasquez v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 188, 198 (4th Cir. 2017)).
In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
Hesson & Gerstein, supra note 22.
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Sympathy and a sense of moral obligation towards this group
persists in the wake of In re A-B-. However, these scenarios pose an
interesting dilemma to Americans that may not be as prevalent
with other individuals applying for asylum. Often, refugees are
viewed as survivors of horrible crimes and are welcomed to the
United States in order to escape such crimes. Underlying this
concept is the idea that such horrendous acts do not happen in the
United States. With domestic violence claims, however, this
argument weakens. Domestic violence is unfortunately prevalent in
the United States.181 In fact, a relatively large portion of violent
crime in the United States is committed by the survivor’s intimate
partner.182 Should any less sympathy be felt for asylum applicants
because individuals are facing similar horrors in our own country?
Of course not. Rather, these individuals should be provided with the
opportunity to receive an equal level of protection as that provided
to individuals who are facing crimes less common in the United
States.
Additionally, a factor necessary for a successful asylum claim
is that the government in the applicant’s country is unwilling or
unable to help the individual. In the United States, though the
problem of domestic violence persists, the government attempts to
provide recourse in ways potentially not available in the country
from which the applicant is fleeing.183 By providing an applicant
asylum, the United States would be allowing the individual to
escape their persecutor and find a home in a place that is taking
steps, albeit slowly, to overcome the problem of domestic violence.
Conclusion
In his analysis in In re A-B-, former Attorney General Jeff
Sessions overruled important precedent regarding gender-based
asylum claims and narrowed the interpretation of such claims,
making it more difficult for survivors of private crimes, namely
gang and domestic violence, to seek asylum in the United States.
However, Sessions’ analysis, when determining if the PSG met the
181. National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Statistics, NCADV.org
https://ncadv.org/statistics [https://perma.cc/W74V-56E6] (stating that “[i]n the
United States, an average of [twenty] people experience intimate partner physical
violence every minute.”).
182. Id. (stating that “[i]ntimate partner violence accounts for 15% of all violent
crime.”).
183. Alisha Haridasani Gupta, Across the Globe, a ‘Serious Backlash Against
Women’s Rights’, N.Y. TIMES: IN HER WORDS (Dec. 4, 2019) https://www.nytimes.co
m/2019/12/04/us/domestic-violence-international.html [https://perma.cc/6MUB-26
5P].
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three-part test of 1) immutability, 2) particularity, and 3) social
visibility, conflated various factors. This conflation arbitrarily
discounted prior case law and created further confusion regarding
the standard to be applied for such claims. Therefore, In re A-Bserves as a strong example of the confusion these additional
requirements cause and makes a strong case as to why this threepart test should be abolished and the Acosta standard should be
reinstated for determining PSG claims. The Acosta standard would
ensure that the category of PSG is interpreted consistently with the
other groups, avoid conflation, prevent individuals from creating
overly complex groups to fulfill an arbitrary standard, and provide
certainty and stability to applicants going through the asylum
system. The courts should reinstate the Acosta standard to give
those with legitimate and satisfactory asylum claims, like Ms. A.B.,
the status they rightfully deserve.

